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SARS Epidemic in Taiwan by Use of a Back-Projection Method
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objectives. To reconstruct the infection curve for the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in Taiwan and to
ascertain the temporal changes in the daily number of infections that occurred during the course of the outbreak.
method. Back-projection method.
results. The peaks of the epidemic correspond well with the occurrence of major infection clusters in the hospitals. The overall
downward trend of the infection curve after early May corresponds well to the date (May 10) when changes in the review and classification
procedure were implemented by the SARS Prevention and Extrication Committee.
conclusion. The major infection control measures taken by the Taiwanese government over the course of the SARS epidemic, particularly
those regarding infection control in hospitals, played a crucial role in containing the outbreak.
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The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic of
2003 presented one of the most serious global health threats
since the emergence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
Uncertainty about clinical and epidemiological aspects of the
novel SARS coronavirus made it difficult to determine ap-
propriate public health interventions to contain the epidemic
during the course of the outbreak.1-3 Despite the lack of a
quantitative method to justify the effectiveness of intervention
measures at the population level, monitoring changes in the
daily number of infections over the course of the epidemic
may provide some insight into the immediate impact and
effectiveness of these measures. An infection curve is a plot
of the daily counts of new infections over the course of the
epidemic. The infection curve for an epidemic would be a
useful and convenient tool for evaluating the effectiveness of
intervention measures.4 However, the daily number of infec-
tions is unobservable. The available information on the daily
number of reported cases, with an unknown individual dis-
ease incubation period, is not sensitive enough to reflect the
spread of the epidemic over the course of the outbreak. The
immediate effect of the intervention measures is therefore
difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, prompt and decisive action
is needed in efforts to contain newly emerging epidemics,
such as the potential threat of pandemic influenza. Hence, a
procedure for the construction of an infection curve using
statistical methods is highly desirable.
In this study, we adopted a back-projection method similar
to that used by Chau and Yip4 to examine the SARS epidemic
in Taiwan. The back-projection method has been widely used
in modeling the spread of HIV infection and acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome.5-7 The clinical course of SARS
progresses from infection, through incubation, to onset of
symptoms, so the back-projection technique can be readily
used in this context. With updated SARS case data, we were
able to reconstruct the infection curve for the SARS outbreak
in Taiwan and show that the fluctuations on the infection
curve fit well with the major events on the time line of that
outbreak. A discussion of the public health implications of
our results is also provided here.
methods
Data
According to the Taiwan Center for Disease Control (TCDC)8
and the World Health Organization (WHO),9 346 patients in
Taiwan were officially confirmed as having SARS. Among
them, there were 37 deaths directly caused by SARS (ie, the
cause of death was recorded as SARS) and 36 SARS-related
deaths (ie, the cause of death was not directly attributed to
SARS). However, in a follow-up study done in collaboration
with the TCDC to track previously unconfirmed cases, a total
of 134 additional SARS coronavirus antibody–positive pa-
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tients were found to have laboratory-confirmed cases of
SARS, 12 of whom died.10 Consequently, the total number of
confirmed SARS cases in Taiwan by the end of December
2004 was 480, which is different from the figure cited in earlier
published reports on SARS in Taiwan.11-15 The definition of
a SARS case used in Taiwan is the same as that used by the
WHO.14,16 These 480 cases with onset of symptoms occurring
between February 25, 2003, and June 25, 2003, were used in
the present study. To our knowledge, this is the first back-
projection study of the Taiwan SARS outbreak that makes
use of the more comprehensive data set of laboratory-con-
firmed SARS cases.
Statistical Analysis
We proposed to use the back-projection method to estimate
the daily counts of newly infected people, or the mean daily
number of new infections. The back-projection method as-
sumes a known distribution for the incubation period on the
basis of data from other studies. The details of the model
employed, including the model assumptions and model pa-
rameters, are given in Appendix A. For our study, we assumed
that the incubation period followed a gamma distribution.
The details pertaining to the choice of gamma distribution
can be found in Appendix B.
It has been shown that age was an important factor in the
SARS case-fatality rate.20 Similarly, it was of interest here to
examine how age was related to infection intensity. The es-
timates of the daily number of infections would certainly be
more accurate and precise, given the additional information,
if age was an important factor.5 The Kruskal-Wallis test was
employed to test for the homogeneity of incubation distri-
butions among 3 age groups: 0-14 years, 15-59 years, and 60
years and older. The effect of age was not significant; the null
hypothesis of homogeneity was not rejected at the 5% sig-
nificance level ( ). Therefore, no age-adjusted expec-Pp .36
tation-maximization-smoothing algorithm4 (EMS; see Ap-
pendix B) was used to estimate the infection curve of the
Taiwan SARS epidemic.
results
Figure 1 gives the estimated daily number of SARS infections,
, from February 18 to June 17, 2003. The point-wise 95%l t
confidence interval for was constructed for each time pointl t
t by using a bootstrapping method.6 A chronological sum-
mary of intervention measures taken in Taiwan21 is also given
in Figure 1.
The major peaks of the estimated values at the heightl t
of the outbreak in Taiwan corresponded well with the oc-
currences of major SARS-related events in Taiwan hospitals.
The first peak, identified as occurring on approximately April
17, corresponded to the infection clusters at Hoping Hospital
and Jenchi Hospital that resulted in the escalation of the
outbreak in Taiwan and, subsequently, the shutdown of Ho-
ping Hospital on April 24 and the shutdown of Jenchi Hos-
pital 2 days later. The second peak, identified as occurring
on approximately April 25, corresponded to the infection
clusters at the National Taiwan University Hospital emer-
gency department (which was shut down on May 12), McKay
Hospital, and Chung-Hsing Hospital in Taipei.14,22 The third
and last peak, identified as occurring on approximately May
5, corresponded to the nosocomial infection cluster at Kao-
hsiung Chang Gung Memorial Hospital in the southern city
of Kaohsiung. A smaller peak occurring on approximately
May 15 corresponded to the infection cluster at Kuandu Hos-
pital in Taipei.
During the height of the outbreak (from mid-April to early
May), the trough in estimated values occurring on ap-l t
proximately April 21 corresponded to an infection cluster at
Hoping Hospital being reported to the health authorities on
April 21 and 22, resulting in a heightened alertness for hos-
pital infection control personnel that lessened the spread of
nosocomial infections at Hoping Hospital. The second trough,
occurring on approximately April 30, corresponded well to
the implementation of level B quarantine policy on April 28;
this marked the start of large-scale border control and home
quarantine, which turned out to be the major turning point
for ending the outbreak in Taiwan.23 Furthermore, the overall
downward trend of the infection curve after early May cor-
responded well to a change in review and classification pro-
cedures implemented by the cabinet-level SARS Prevention
and Extrication Committee in Taiwan on May 10 to expedite
the review and reclassification of suspected SARS cases in an
effort to quickly identify and isolate the patients who truly
had SARS.21 April 28 was determined to be an important date
for significantly expediting quick identification of suspected
cases (thereby decreasing the time between onset and diag-
nosis), and May 10 was an important date for swiftly clas-
sifying probable cases (thereby decreasing the time between
diagnosis and reclassification).10
discussion
The estimated daily number of infections during the course
of an epidemic is a good indicator of the infection intensity.
The immediate benefit of certain effective intervention mea-
sures is easily seen because of their influence on reducing the
daily number of infections. With the convolution of the in-
cubation period, the time at which a patient is infected is
unobservable. Hence, it is desirable to use statistical methods
to reconstruct the infection curve that allow for the evaluation
of the effectiveness of intervention measures. The back-pro-
jection method, which is a very useful tool in modeling ep-
idemics, can be readily used in this context.
The use of the back-projection method, relying on the
aggregate observed daily number of patients with confirmed
SARS, to construct the infection curve has advantages over
tracing the patients’ contact history, as done by Karlberg et
al.24 The case-study method24 is very useful in understanding
the epidemic. However, it is not efficient and may be very
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figure. Time line showing estimated daily mean number of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases (and point-wise 95%
confidence intervals [CIs]) during the 2003 outbreak in Taiwan and major infection control interventions. WHO, World Health
Organization.21
time consuming, because a detailed contact history for each
individual is needed. Moreover, such information is usually
unavailable and/or unreliable, especially during the course of
the epidemic, and the infection curve estimated by the case-
study method is subject to individual fluctuations. The es-
timated infection curve obtained from the back-projection
method smooths out these fluctuations so that waves of in-
fection can be clearly identified. Chau and Yip4 used the back-
projection method to analyze the 2003 SARS outbreak in
Hong Kong. They managed to show that 4 waves of infection
had occurred over the course of that outbreak. It is interesting
to note that 3 of the 4 waves (ie, all except the outbreak at
Amoy Garden)4 originated in hospitals.
Other similar studies on the evaluation of intervention
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measures used during SARS outbreaks can be found in Hsieh
et al.23 and Pang et al.25 Hsieh et al.23 applied the Richards
model26 to the daily cumulative number of cases during the
Taiwan SARS outbreak, and they estimated that April 28 was
the turning point of the outbreak: on this date, the growth
rate of the cumulative number of cases attained its maximum
level, decreasing gradually thereafter. However, this method
does not provide information on each major and minor wave
of the epidemic. Pang et al.25 utilized the time lag between
onset of illness and hospitalization during the Beijing SARS
epidemic. This method is very simple and can be computed
quite easily by hand. However, the evaluation of control mea-
sures with this method was further complicated by the time
lag of at least 1 incubation period between implementation
of the measure and the time that the intervention took effect.
The Taiwan SARS outbreak displayed a pattern very similar
to that of the Hong Kong outbreak. Each major peak of the
outbreak corresponds to infection clusters in hospitals. If the
infection control measures in affected hospitals were more
effective, it is likely that the epidemic could be contained
within the hospital compounds and would not be able to
spread as readily to other patients, hospital staff, and visitors
in the hospitals, and, subsequently, would not spread as read-
ily to the community. There are a number of issues that need
to be critically addressed in the control and prevention of
SARS or any emerging infectious disease in hospitals. The
availability of isolated wards to prevent cross-infection be-
tween patients with and patients without SARS, as well as
the adequate supply of protective equipment and medical
items, all play important parts in containing the epidemic.
Nevertheless, the professionalism exhibited by the medical
and healthcare staff during the outbreak, in terms of their
dedication, sacrifice, and medical knowledge and training, is
also a crucial factor in combating the disease.
Although infection intensity did not show significant age
dependence, the SARS fatality rate was found to be age de-
pendent.20 It is also important to advise people to seek ap-
propriate medical assistance immediately after the onset of
possible symptoms. However, hospitalization might actually
increase the risk of infection as a result of an insufficient
number of isolation wards in hospitals and overstressed med-
ical staff dealing with an influx of persons with suspected
(but not genuine) cases. Consequently, in the case of a new-
ly emerging infectious disease epidemic, quick identification
and isolation of patients with actual and highly probable cases
in a single ward in a hospital is essential to control the ep-
idemic and to prevent the spread of infection in the hospital.
To achieve this, some effective discriminatory authority dur-
ing the course of the epidemic is very important.27,28
The Taiwanese government implemented numerous inter-
vention measures, including 2 levels of quarantine. Level A
quarantine applied to people who potentially had contact with
infectious individuals, and level B quarantine applied to trav-
elers coming from affected areas abroad. More than 150,000
people were notified and placed under home quarantine, us-
ing limited contact tracing and border control measures. Only
24 of these quarantined individuals turned out to have
SARS,10 which accounted for only 5% of all confirmed SARS
cases. One should note, however, that full-scale (ie, level A
and level B) quarantine in Taiwan was not implemented until
April 28, when several major hospital-based infection clusters
had already occurred.27 Therefore, swift home quarantine of
potentially exposed individuals and voluntary quarantine of
individuals with subclinical symptoms should be considered.
These could be effective complementary intervention mea-
sures to prevent people who are potentially infectious from
spreading the epidemic further in the community. In addi-
tion, these measures could prevent hospitals from being over-
burdened with patients who have suspected cases that turn
out not to be genuine. Such complementary measures are
particularly relevant if no effective medical treatment is read-
ily available during the early stages of emerging novel infec-
tious diseases, as in the case of SARS in 2003 or the potential
mutation of avian influenza virus (H5N1) to a strain that can
be transmitted from person to person.
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appendix a
The Model
Let be the time units (in days) for the data.tp 1, 2, … , T
Note that the first recognized SARS patient in Taiwan was a
54-year-old businessperson who traveled to Guangdong Prov-
ince, China, on February 5, 2003, returned to Taipei via Hong
Kong on February 21, and had onset of symptoms on Feb-
ruary 25. Given that most estimates of the SARS incubation
period are less than 8 days,16-18 it is therefore unlikely that
the infection would have occurred before February 18, if we
take into account of the length of the incubation period.
Therefore, February 18 is assumed to be the start of the
epidemic in Taiwan, and this date is denoted . The latesttp 1
data available for analysis were from June 25, 2003, and thus
T is set at 128 days.
Parameters
The variable indicates the expected number of individualsmt
with onset of symptoms on day t. The variable indicatesl t
the expected number of infections on day t. The variable
indicates the probability that an individual is infected onft,d
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day t and has an incubation period of d days. The variable
indicates the number of individuals infected on day tNt,d
with an incubation period of d days. The variable indicatesYt
the number of reported and/or confirmed cases on day t.
Assumptions
The daily numbers of infections are assumed to follow in-
dependent Poisson processes with intensities forl tpt
. In addition, the daily numbers of confirmed and/1, … , T
or identified cases are assumed to follow independent Poisson
processes with intensities
t1
m p l ft ts ts,s
sp0
for day t.
Because the incubation period is relatively short and the
basic treatment is quarantine,10 the effect of the infection time
d on the incubation period is minimal and may be ignored.
Hence, is simplified as .f fts,s s
appendix b
Expectation-Maximization-Smoothing Algorithm (EMS)
There are 2 adequate fits to SARS-associated data sets, namely
the Weibull and gamma distributions.4,18 The complete data
log-likelihood function for is given as follows:l t
T Tt
log Lp {N log (l f ) l f } , (1) t,d t d t d
tp1 dp0
where is assumed to follow either a gamma or a Weibullfd
distribution, and the cumulative density functions are
t0.5
1
a1 x/bF(t)p x e dxab G(a)
0
or
t 0.5
aF(t)p 1 exp {[ ] } ,
b
respectively. Unknown parameters for the 2 distribu-(a,b)
tions mentioned above can be estimated on the basis of the
incubation-days of 98 patients, with their infection dates be-
ing identified retrospectively.
In practice, we can only observe . Mathematically, weYt
have
t1
Y p N .t td,d
dp0
A convenient tool to estimate in a situation in which datal t
are missing is the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm.
However, the estimates of may be very erratic, and thel t
interpretation is generally made more sensible by smoothing
out the estimates. Hence, the expectation-maximization-
smoothing (EMS) algorithm6 was adopted in the current anal-
ysis, using the algorithm summarized below.
Expectation Step
The posterior expectation of given can be shownN Y , … ,Yt,d 1 T
to be
l ft dE(N FY ,Y , … ,Y )p Y .tdt,d 1 2 T td  l fi tdi
ip1
Maximizing Step
The maximum likelihood estimates of can be obtained byl t
the iterative updating equations
Tt[j]˜l Y ft td d[j1]ˆl p ,Tt tdt
[j]dp0 ˜ f  l fd t tdi
dp0 ip1
where
[j]˜lt
is the estimate of at the j-th iteration.l t
Smoothing Step
As the fluctuation among the observed daily number of SARS
confirmed cases is not that erratic, we can simply adopt a 3-
width window to smooth out the
[j]ˆlt
in each iteration in the M-step. The corresponding weights
are and . Therefore, we havew p w p 0.1 w p 0.80 2 1
2
[j1]˜ ˆl p wl[j 1]t i 1 .t i
ip0
Hence, the smoothed estimate of is given byl t
[j]˜ ˜l p lim l .t jr t
A gamma form for yields a value of 403.01 for thefd
log-likelihood function (1), whereas a Weibull form yields
501.23, indicating that in the case of the Taiwan SARS
outbreak, the incubation distribution is better fitted by the
gamma distribution. The estimated mean duration (SD)
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of the incubation period for SARS in Taiwan is 6.33
days. Donnelly et al.19 used a gamma distribution for3.22
data on the incubation period of SARS in Hong Kong, with
an estimated mean duration (SD) of days.6.37 4.09
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